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SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ORGANISATION OF PLANNING IN MULTI-DIVISIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY AS A CASE ILLUSTRATION
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the organisation of planning
activities in large organisation. Planning is an essential
activity that must be carried out by all organisations if they
are to continue to exist in the real, unstatic world. However,
the organisation of planning may take many different forms, from
the use of large centralised planning units to a largely informal,
unspecialised activity carried out at many organisational levels.
The main thesis of this paper is that there exist particular
definable and qualitatively measurable factors that determine in
any particular case the organisation of planning that will be
most suitable. The centre of interest here is on problems which
are peculiar to divisionalized structures, in which each division has
a planning function which feeds into a planning function for the
corporate whole. It is hypothesised that where the situations
facing each of the divisions would lead naturally to the adoption
of different forms of planning, pressures exist forcing them
towards similar forms. In this circumstance one or more of the
divisions will find itself with a poorly adapted system. At the
corporate level difficult trade-offs will need to be made between
maladaptation in one part of the organisation as against some
other part.
Much of the paper is concerned with discussion of a theore-
,
tical nature characterising different ways of organising planning
and the factors determining the suitability of one mode rather
than another. However, the ideas are tested against the experiences
gained from study of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The field
work on the TVA was carried out by a team of IIASA scientists
during 1975. The study was a wide ranging one covering manage-
ment practices, strategy formulation, planning, use of models,
environmental management and organisation structure. The infor-
mation used here draws especially on the findings of study related
to organisation structure and planning. [1]
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In some papers on planning a somewhat narrow view has been
taken. Planning has been equated with the formal procedures and
methods followed in producing a 'plan' - a document which outlines
allocation of resources between activities for a defined period
ahead. This approach has sometimes supported statements to the
effect that in particular organisations planning does not exist,
or is hardly developed. According to the approach adopted here
such statements arise because of a confusion between the
essential function of planning and a particular way of organising
that function.
We assume here that continued survival is a fundamental
objective of almost all organisations. (Possibly, exceptions may
be found where an organisation is set up to deal with some
transient problem and does not intend to survive longer than the
solution of that problem.) However, since no organisations can
expect to exist in an unchanging world where their resources and
demands for their outputs remain constant, organisations need to
examine and choose between future options and take decisions
consistent with that chosen option. The planning function is the
process of searching for possible future alternatives which meet
the organisations objectives, and elaborating these to support
necessary current decisions about the future. Where a future
alternative involves many different activities, the process of
planning must take a holistic view, and consider the interactions
of these activities one upon the other. This is integration and
it is an essential part of the planning process. Planning may be
carried out formally or informally, use or not use special tech-
niques and mayor may not be carried out by a specialised depart-
ment.
In essence we are viewing planning not as an organisational
form, but as an organisational function. This view follows the
cybernetic model of organisation proposed by Beer [2], although
we do not here follow Beer in adopting this model as a unique
model for viable organisation. Also we include in the ｰ ｲ ｯ ｣ ｾ ｳ ｳ
of planning the formation of planning links between divisions of
a corporation rather than distinguishing this as a coordination
function. Section 3 of this paper identifies two completely
contrasting ways of organising the planning function.
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A basic proposition of the paper is that the organisation
of planning most suited to a case depends upon two factors,
referred to as technology and environment. These ｦ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｷ ｨ ｩ ｬ ｳ ｴ
defined in many different ways,have been prominent in recent
work on organisation structure. Whilst environment of an orga-
nisation has generally been related to planning, technology has
not. Section 2 of this paper provides an explanation of how we
are using the terms. Because our interest is with multi-divisional
structures the environment is broken down into the external-to-
the-corporation environment (which is what is generally meant by
environment in organisation studies) and the corporate environ-
ment, i.e. the environment of anyone division which is composed
purely of other divisions. Some new conceptual ideas are presented
for understanding the corporate environment.
To the extent that technology and environment can be taken
to influence structure and procedures than for multi-divisional
structures we have to recognise the possibility of a new problem.
Where technology and environment vary over parts of a corporate
structure, they may require varying organisational responses
which oouldthreaten the integrity of the corporate structure as a
whole. Section 4 elaborates this. It seems that this aspect has
remained generally unrecognised in the literature. An important
exception is work by Lawrence and Lorsch [3], but they were
dealing with a rather different situation to that described here.
By drawing on the ideas contained in the discussion of
planning, technology and environment some specific propositions
are proposed and are tested against the experience of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. However, problems met transcend this particular
case. For example, they seem equally relevant to cases arising in
the field of regional development where one is dealing with a multi-
organisation rather than elements of a single organisation, and
they indicate gaps in scientific knowledge about organisation
performance. These matters are discussed in fue final section of
this paper.
2. ｾ ｅ ｃ ｈ ｎ ｏ ｌ ｏ ｇ ｙ ｦ ｵ ｾ ｄ ENVIRONMENT
2.1. Technology - Since the publication of Woodward's
pioneering studies [4] showing that organisational structure in
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a sample of industrial firms was best explained by considering
the nature of the work process, many studies have sought to
relate technology to structure. This work has been both concerned
with extending the concept of technology beyond a narrow technolo-
gical concept based on workflow, and with producing more easily
definable and measurable concepts of technology. Perrow [5] was
largely influential in extending the concept and applying it
outside of the industrial sphere. He did this by relating tech-
nology to the level of routiness an employee meets in his job.
Complex technology then becomes associated with lack of routines
or uncertainty in a process, be it administrative or industrial.
The concept of technology used here adopts this general approach
but we follow Woodward in viewing technology as the property of a
system rather than as operating on an individual level Ｈ ｲ ･ Ｍ ｐ ･ ｲ ｲ ｯ ｷ ｾ
According to the view taken here a process follows a simple
technology when pre-programmed rules govern the relationships of
the elements of the process one to another and when rules also
exist to deal with exception situations. A complex technology
allows the application of no such rules, or to the extent that
such rules occur they are invalidated by an abundance of excep-
tion situations. In shortJindividuals in a complex technology
will find themselves with low routiness, high uncertainty and
perhaps spending much time searching for appropriate actions.
There is an explicit equation here of the technology of a
process with its modelability. The ultimate in simple technology
is where the whole process is modelable; for the extreme complex
technology no part of it is. The interesting implication here is
that technology is not an absolute measure but depends on the
state of knowledge of the process. As understanding of a process
increases so its technology (if this understanding is applied)
becomes more simple. Landing man on the moon using wholly auto-
mated systems is a very simple technology task; where a human
,
pilot has to be involved, the technology is considerably more
complex.
2.2. Environment - In some sense our concept of technology
characterises the internal space of an organisation. To charac-
terise the external space we immediately become concerned with
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environment. For the division of an organisation (or more generally
a sub-system) there are two different relevant environments - the
corporate environment (including other sUb-systems of the same
system), and the external-to-the-corporation environment. These
two environments are worth considereing seperately because of the
differences in degrees of control that can be exercised over them.
The rules operating in the corporate environment are defined
largely by the centre.
2 . 2 . 1. External envirorurent - As with teclmology the influence of
envirol1Il'eI1t on organization has been the object of IPal1y studies but there is
no generally accepted typology of organisational environments. A
recent review article [6] drawing on recently published works
suggests a typology which distinguishes 64 types of organisational
environment. These 64 arise from a combination of 16 general
environmental characteristics with 4 environmental movement
characteristics. The 16 environmental characteristics are made
up of combinations of the four binary categories: complex/non-
complex, routine/non-routine, organised/disorganised, directly
affecting/indirectly affecting. An enquiry into the nature of
these categories suggests that they can all be contained within
a reasonably wide definition of complex/non-complex. Here we
characterise a complex environment as one that can take many
states, each different state requiring a particular organisational
response. Hence the organisation needs to maintain some sig-
nificant level of effort monitoring its environment. Using this
general notation of complexity the various other concepts referred
to are not seperate dimensions, rather they characterise the sorts
of conditions that may be expected in complex or non-complex
environments. For example, we may expect that where the environ-
ment is non-routine (in the sense that it adopts states which
cannot be dealt with by routine procedures of the organisation),
where it is disorganised (in the sense that the entities with
which the organisation must interact are nor organised into a
few groups), and where the environment is indirect (in the sense
that the organisation has reduced possibility for control over it)"
then we would expect to find a complex environment· Hence, this
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reference is more useful in the guide it gives on how to go about
recognising complexity rather than in producing dimensions of
environment.
The concept of movement in an environment does, however,
seem distinguished from the concept of complexity. Complexity
refers to the number of states the environment may adopt and
very high complexity may be accomodated by a high level of
monitoring. However, movement ,is concerned with the way over
time the environment switches between states. Where this is
very rapid and very unpredictable monitoring the present may not
be sufficient, although it may ｾ ･ necessary to sensitise the
organisation to when change has occured. In this case highly
flexible organisation response may be called for.
As we found with technology, we find with environment that
its characterisation is not an absolute measure but is related
to the availability of models. The number of perceived indep-
endent states of an environment is reduced as more advanced
models structure relationships between them. An apparantly
highly unpredictable environment may be easily managed through
use of forecasting models.
2.2.2. Corporate Environment - Complexity is an appropriate
dimension for characterising the. corporate environment surrounding
an organisational unit. It is then a measure of the number of
other units in the larger organisation whose actions and outputs
affect that unit, and the number of different states each of the
other units can adopt. However, unlike the external environment
the complexity of the corporate environment is dependent on
corporate policy. The organisational sub-units of the system
can develop links with one another to reduce environmental complexity.
Such links may arise either spontaneously or as a response to
corporate policy.
When one unit, say unit 1, considers forming links with
another (unit 2) there are two competing factors that have to
be taken into account, from the point of view of that ,unit.
First, forming links will lead to a reduction in the complexity
of the corporate environment. If changes in state of unit 2,
significantly affect the ability of unit 1 to achieve its objectives
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then this reduction of environmental complexity will be highly
favourable to unit 1. However, against this gain there may have
to be balanced costs if such links lead to a loss of autonomy of
unit 1, in particular a loss of flexibility in responding to changes
in the external environment. If changes in the external environment
of unit 1 are more critical for its achievement of objectives than
changes in the state of unit 2, the cost of linkages may be greater
than the benefits. Considerations of this type determine the extent
to which unit 1 seeks to form linkages to reduce the complexity of
its corporate environment. However, the extent to which it will be
able to form links in practice, in a situation unconstrained by
corporate policy, depends upon the cost/benefit balancing from the
point of view of the other units 2 n, with which it may seek
to form links. In this respect the environment may be characterised
according to whether it is highly balanced or highly unbalanced.
A balanced environment is one in which the unit is able to form links
to the extent it desires to. An unbalanced one is where the value
trade-offs on linkages made by other units do not correspond to that
of unit 1, so that it cannot form as extensive links as it wants.
We assume that in an unconstrained situation links are formed only
where they are perceived as beneficial by both units being linked.
This dimension of balance is added to the dimensions of complexity
and change to characterise the corporate environment.
3. CHARAC'l'ERISATION OF PLANNING SYSTEMS
The way in which planning is organised can be characterised
on a spectrum which at one extreme has what we designate as top-
down analytic systems and at the other extreme bottom-up synthetic.
The terms refer to the nature of project generation in the case.
Typical organisation for these extreme types differ in use of
models, use of specialised planning departments and often on the
formality of the planning process.
3.1. Top-down Analytic Systems - Top-down analytic systems
are ones in which future activity options are generated in a central
planning unit and are described initially at a high level of
aggregation. A large part of the planning activity 1s concerned
with the elaboration of an option by breaking it down into activities
for the different operational units of the organisation - this is
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the signrficance of the term analytic. A strength of this mode
of planning is the high degree of integration between sub-activities
it allows (since they are all elaborations of a single aggregate
set). This may be crucial when activities are very highly inter-
dependent. However to achieve this integration it is necessary
that the interactions between activities be well understood.
Without this understanding the splitting down of aggregate
activities into components cannot be supported. An illustration
of this is found in economic planning. Through the use of input-
output type models a very high degree of integration becomes in
principle possible using top-down planning systems. Without such
models the degree of integration that the system potentially
allows cannot be achieved. Understanding the interactions of a
process, and its behaviour with changing inputs is, according to
our terminology, a characteristic of simple technology. So
top-down/analytic systems are most suited to simple technology.
A potential weakness of such systems is a lack of responsive-
ness to environment. This is because in many situations a central
planning unit may be limited in the signals it can handle from
the environment. This is but a simple application of the Law
of Requisite Variety [7]. In practice therefore top-down systems
may be most suited to fairly simple environments.
3.2. Bottom-Up Synthetic Systems - Bottom-up/synthetic
systems are ones in which future options are generated at the
lowest levels of the organization. These pass up the organization
to a planning unit that will generally be smaller than in compa-
rable systems in which a top-down system operates. The planning
process is one of adding together (synthesising) and integrating
at each stage proposals from lower down. Because the initial
proposals may have been generated taking into account very
different sets of local needs the process of integration may be
a difficult one to manage. Even where interactions between
activities are well understood that system does not allow easy
application of models or rules for integration. Thus where
interactions are extensive and understood this difficulty may
operate decisively against bottom-up systems. However where
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interactions are not well understood, that is the technology is
complex, bottom-up systems may have the advantage. This is
because the system pushes questions of integration down to
operational levels of an organization where intuitive understand-
ing of complex interactions is likely to be better than in a
central unit.
The major advantage of this system of planning is the
responsiveness it allows to complex environments. The capacity
to monitor environment is not here limited to the capacity of any
one unit, but can draw upon all of the employees of the organi-
zation.
The discussion on environmental characteristics used the two
concepts of complexity and change; complexity refers to the number
of states the environment might adopt, and change to the way it
shifts between states. Of course all environmentswhose complexity
is greater than unity change but differences occur in the rates
with which they move between states. The movement in a simple
environment may be greater than in a complex one. High, unpredict-
able change rates cause problems whatever planning system one uses.
Ultimately an organization may be forced into highly robust
strategies which have the effect of reducing the change character-
istics of the environment. This is because when we think of
organizational environment we consider not everything in the
environment but only things whose change of state affect the
organization. As soon as a strategy is designed which is un-
affected by the movement of some rapidly changing element in the
environment, that element is no longer considered as part of the
environment. To the extent that such strategies reduce the complex-
ity of the environment they favour moves towards top-down systems.
However the complexity of the environment of a robust strategy
may still be very high. The alternative to this is for the
organization to adopt a highly opportunistic approach in which
planning to achieve objectives is abandoned in favour of deve-
loping a very fast response to current opportunities. However this
is possible only with organization objectives of a very special
nature.
In all this discussion it is recognized that the description
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of both top/down and bottom/up systems, an extreme type is presented
which will not be found in practice. All real systems will embody
iterations and information flow both up and down. So that in
bottom/up systems, some filters will be specified from the centre
outlined the type of projects which are consonant with the
organizations objectives. In top/down systems the central gener-
ation of a plan will be supported by information from operating
levels. However real systems can be classified according to the
type to which they predominantly correspond.
3.3. Planning in Multi-divisional Organizations - The
comments on planning so far are related to any autonomous unit.
The focus on planning in this paper is on particular problems
of planning in a multi-divisional organization. The characteristic
of the planning environment of one division of such an organization
is that part of its environment is formed by other units in the
same corporation. If the corporation is to have meaning as an
entity then some degree of integration between divisions is
required; links must be formed across the corporate environment.
Using the designation of planning systems as top/down or bottom/up,
four situations can be distinguished.
la
Figure 1 Possible Configuration of Planning in Multi-divisional
Organizations
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Here a central top/down system is used at the corporate level.
From the point of view of planning the whole organization exists
as a single body; planning is effectively not divisionalized and the
nature of the corporate environment of anyone division need not
be considered.
Figure Ib
Top/down systems are used within divisions but the integration
between divisions is handled at the divisional level. In essence
viewed from the corporate level the system is bottom/up. This is
a rather unlikely model to occur in practice; it combines the
disadvantages of top/down systems (namely, difficulties in respond-
ing to complex environment) without the advantages of ease of
integration at the corporate level. Nevertheless it is ? possible
model and if the corporate level does not play an integrating
role then each division must take account of its corporate
environment in generating its own choices for the future. Links
between divisions are thus required for planning purposes and these
appropriately occur between the planning units. Whether such links
will occur spontaneously to a degree that reflects the corporate
trade-off between overall integration and divisional flexibility
depends on whether the corporate environments are balanced in the
sense used above (Section 2.2.b). When environments are balanced
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the appropriate level of linkages will arise without the support
of formal mechanisms. When this is not so the corporate interest
requires that links be formalized.
Figure lc
In this case all of the divisions of the corporation follow
bottom/up modes of planning. A corporate office may have some role
in integrating planning proposals coming up from the divisions
but the nature of the planning mode requires that the bulk of
integration occurs lower down. In this case, as in the last one,
a division must take account of the corporate environment, and
planning links between divisions will be necessary. Here the
links need to operate at many levels - since there is no single
level that has responsibility for planning. Whether or not the
necessary links will arise and be supported informally depends
again on the extent of balance in the corporate environment. If
the environment is unbalanced then formal mechanisms laid down
at the corporate level will play an essential role in achieving
integration across divisions.
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Figure ld
This case is a mixed situation in which some of the divisions
operate top/down. planning modes while others operate bottom/up.
It is a case which is of great interest here. A central thesis
of this paper is that while it may reflect the different needs of
the various divisions, in practice it is subject to overwhelming
difficulties of implementation. Viewed from the corporate level
there are two main resons for this. Firstly, to the extent that
links must occur between divisions across the corporate environ-
ment, they need to connect a planning office in one division
to several levels not especially identified with planning in
another. However the temporal dimension of planning, its per-
ceived purpose, and the outlooks of the people involved ('planners'
on the one hand - scientists, managers, administrators on the other)
are likely to be so different that these links cannot be satis-
factorily specified or supported.
Secondly, at the corporate level, there may be difficulties
in designing a planning interface that is satisfactory for
dealing with divisional plans generated in such radically different
ways. The corporate input to a top/down divisional system may be
quite different to the input to a bottom/up system. Of course two
separate interfaces could be created, but if divisional proposals
interact, the effect of this is just to push the interface problem
elsewhere.
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There is a further anticipated problem, behavioral in nature.
The mode of planning used in an organizauion may be an important
factor governing the corporate self-image. There is a tempting
(but not always justified) equation of bottom/up systems with an
informal, decentralized style. Top/down systems sometimes suggest
the opposite. At the corporate level a strong identification may
exist with one or other of these styles. This corporate self-image
may be an important factor in choice of planning system. It would
naturally tend to favour a particular mode used more or less
uniformly across divisions.
4. PLANNING, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT
The ideas presented in the previous sections are brought
together and summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
We can go now to examine the case of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Data from this case will alow a test to be made of
four of the propositions contained in the tables. These are:
1) Bottom/up planning is well adapted to complex technology
in a complex environment
2) Bottom/up planning is not well adapted to simple technology
in a simple environment
3) Informal links for planning coordination are adapted only
to balanced environments
4) Factors operate against the operation of several modes of
planning within a corporation.
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Table 1 Divisional Preferences
Environment Technology
Type of
System Complex Simple Complex Simple
Top-down Difficulty in Good Difficult Good
monitoring to achieve
environment integration
Bottom-up Good Redundancy Integration Difficulty
in aided by in achieving
information process high
flows understanding integration
at low level
Table 2 Corporate View
Divisional Planning Systems
Corporate
level
Corporate
planning
Links
between
divisions
Bottom-up
Limited
function
possible
Depends on
'balance'
Formal means
where balance
is low
Top-down
Central corporate
planning desirable
Not necessary if
central corporate
planning operates
Mixed
Difficulties in
establishing
mode and interface
Difficult to
define and
implement
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5. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
5.1. Corporate Stucture - The TVA is a federal agency created
in 1933 by an Act of Congress. Its early objectives were to improve
the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley region through harnessing
the powers of an uncontrolled river system - the primary activity
was dam construction to provide flood control, navigation and
hydro-generation of electricity. Improvement of local agriculture
was also a.main concern. The TVA has remained a mUlti-purpose
agency; though its power generation'activities now employ a very
large percentage of its staff and over 90% of its investment, it
is concerned also with environmental quality, agriculture, support
for local communities and other such things.
To manage such diversified activities the TVA has adopted a
divisionalised corporate stucture. At the centre is a three-man
board concerned with policy, and under it an office of the General
Manager. This office contains a planning and budget staff, and
is supported by service divisions (personnel, purchasing and so on) •
A full description of the structure is given in the paper by
Tomb (latFigure 2 shows the current organisation chart.
The major planning effort in the TVA is delegated to the
operational divisions. The planning cycle used in the TVA is
described by Tomlinson(lb).It embodies three main elements leading
to the submission of a programme to Congress for approval.
The first element of the cycle is the production of a
"Situation Assessment" by each of the divisions. This is supposed
to be a wide-ranging assessment of the problems and opportunities
facing the division. The divisional environment, both external
and corporate, is reviewed here. In producing this document
staff at all levels in the divisions are involved. It is a
procedure capable of monitoring a highly complex environment.
Situation Assessments are reviewed by the corporate planning
staff. Any modifications in the divisional pictures .of problems
and opportunities required by corporate interests are fed in here.
The next s'tage is the production by the divisions of a summary
planning document covering the period 5-10 years ahead. This plan
is based upon the Situation Assessment.
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After corporate review the summary plan is elaborated by the
divisions into detailed 5-year budget submissions.
It is, however, not possible to understand the true nature
of this process without inquiring into the capacity of the
corporate planning unit to review at each of these stages. The
office concerned with review has very few staff, and accepts its
lack of capacity to achieve real integration. Its review of
Situation Assessments is limited to reading them and identyfying
gross conflicts of interest. No formal procedures are used
for recognising less evident or potential interactions. At the
corporate level the Situation Assessment procedure has been
justified in terms of the benefits it oonveys on the divisions
ｾ ｮ having to make this wide ranging review. The marked absence
of planning capacity has led Tomlinson to characterise the whole
process as 'a magnificent body without a brain.' (lb)
It seems clear that in our classification of corporate
planning systems described above (3.3) the TVA sees itself clearly
as Case 3: bottom-up planning in divisions with the integrating
load undertaken at divisional level. This implies planning links
are necessary between divisions, and it is recognised at the
corporate level. 10 achieve this a system of 'self-coordination'
has been adopted. This system requires that when one division
is including in its plans an activity that has an effect on another
division, the plan should be discussed between divisions, and
conflicts resolved at that level. However, no rules are laid
down for this. It is up to the initiating division to decide
where the interactions occur, and no sanctions appear to operate
if it does not 'self-coordinate.' Hence as it appears to operate
the policy of 'self-coordination' cannot be viewed as a formal
procedure supporting links between divisions. Links will be
formed where both of the agencies involved see it in their interest
and will not in other cases. In such circumstances corporate
need for integration will only occur where the corporate environ-
ment perceived by divisions is balanced.
5.2. Planning in Divisions - We have indicated that the
corporate pD?ferenoe. is for bottom-up divisional planning, and
integration between divisions occuring informally. The field-
study on the TVA allowed the possibility for two divisions to
- 17 -
assess how far this occured in practice and how well the mode of
planning was suited to their needs. The divisions studied were
the Division of Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife Development and
the Office of Power. They were selected because of the contrasts
they provide in many of the characteristics of interest to us.
Fuller organisational descriptions of these divisions is given
in the Paper by Davies (lc).
5.2.1 The Division of Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife Developrrent
Nature of Workload and Environment
The broad objectives of this division are to develop wild-
life, fisheries, forests a?d recreation for the benefit of the
region. It has close relationships with state, federal and
other bodies and its means of implementaion are primarily through
demonstrational and educational means.
The technology of the workload in our terminology can be
characterised as complex. Many divisional staff seem to be
working in areas where new situations constantly arise and which
require decisions to which no readily available rules can be
applied. Staff with a range of scientific and other skills work
in the division and many of the seperate tasks require inputs
from these different skills. However, in complex natural resource
systems there are few models which adequately describe the
problems, and which can structure the relationships of the
different types of contributions.
The external environment is similarly complex. The division's
activities relate directly to the quality of the life of people
in the region. Hence it needs to be aware of the needs, ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｣ ｴ ｡ ｾ
tions and preferences of the Valley communities. The relevant
environment also contains many special interest groups concerned
with fishing and forest management, and other research groups.
Few models are available to effectively reduce the number of
states the environment can take. Community values in particular
are difficult to predict.
In discussion above (2.21) on environments, three factors
were taken to militate towards complex environment - unorganised,
unroutine and indirectly affected. While to an extent the
environment does consist of organised groups, there appear to be
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many such groups and the interests of individual members of the
community must be remembered. Changes of state in the environment
cannot generally be dealt with by a routine response, and the
division has only indirect means - education and demonstration -
to influence the state of the environment. We, thus, find in
the environment of the division all the factors that support a
view of complexity.
We find a complex corporate environment also, programmes of
the division affect and are affected by the programmes of other
divisions. The corporate environment is conveniently divided
into two parts.
In one part the interaction occurs because of complementary
responsibilities in the general area of environmental (in the
wide sense) quality. In this area development and investigative
studies by the division often depend upon skills and interests
found in other divisions (for example, concerned with environ-
mental protection, water quality, agriculture). Hence, the
interaction is very high and by forming links benefits may be
significant. The other side of the coin is a loss of autonomy
by forming links. There seems reason to believe that this is
not very important. While the division needs to remain responsive
to a complex environment, where projects interact with other
divisions they are facing largely a similar environment and
would need to react in a similar way. Also the other divisions
involved appear of roughly similar size and influence so no
undue loss of autonomy would result from influence differentials.
The conditions seem such that the division would favour a
high level of links with these other divisions. While no
detailed study of these other divisions was possible, the
situation from their point of view should be essentially
similar. This part of the corporate environment seems therefore
to be balanced and favourable to planning links.
The second part of the corporate environment is that
composed of the Office of Power. A substantial portion of the
staff of the division are employed on work which is of direct
interest to, and charged to, the Power programme. Major examples
of this are monitoring of fish stocks in water reservoirs
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around power stations and responsibility for supervising land
reclamation by coal suppliers who use strip-mining methods.
These activities clearly affect the power programme (see below)
but they are defined by corporate policy and the plans of the
Office of Power do not neccessarily affect the division in
carrying out these projects. Hence the interaction between
th activities is not reciprocal. Also through forming links
the division may lose autonomy since the Office of Power is
by far the larger unit and is also the 'paying agency.'
We therefore have a situation in which the environment
seems to be highly unbalanced. We would expect the division
wants to form fewer links than the Office of Power wants to
form with it. However, in a situation where no rules exist
requiring such links to be formed, they will not be formed and
we would not expect to detect disatisfactions within ｾ ｴ ｬ ｲ ｩ ｳ ､ ｩ ｶ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ
Planning in Practice - From discussions with senior divisional
management down to some heads of individual projects a strong
impression of satisfaction with the planning system was received.
The Situation Assessment procedure was viewed as being highly
appropriate to the needs of the division. In its own manual on
planning procedures emphasis is laid on the needs for employees
at all levels to be involved, and also for employees to seek
opinions from outside of the TVA. The manual justifies this
in terms of the diverse nature of its activities. Indeed
prior to' the system being institutionalised on a TVA-wide basis,
the division was itself adopting a similar procedure.
In its links with other divisions similar satisfaction was
expressed. Close links are maintained with other divisions
operating in the 'environmental' areas. At times these ･ ｾ ｴ ･ ｮ ､
to inter-divisional projects, although interestingly no formal
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｣ ･ ､ ｾ ｲ ･ ｳ exist for setting up such projects. Their management
is handled informally. With respect to the Office of Power
some concern was expressed about the percentage of the division's
activities which are funded by the power programme and the
adoption, ｳ ｯ ｭ ･ ｴ ｩ ｭ ･ ｾ of a narrow view by the Office of Power on
what the scope of these activities should be.
Generally the absence of 'bureaucratic' procedures in the
TVA was welcomed. The highly informal mode of planning was seen
as adequate and appropriate to the division's needs.
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5.2.2. The Office of Power: Na.ture of Workload a,nd Environment
The Office of Power is a multi-divisional unit concerned with the
power programme. It is responsible both for generation and
transmission of electricity, and for planning new capacity to
meet future demand. A primary objective is to ensure that
power is sold at the lowest possible rate.
Although a power system is very complicated from the
engineering point of view, in our sense of the word it is not
a complex technology. Most of the operating decisions that must
be made and some aspects of planning are routine in nature. Rules
will have been established to deal with the range of contingencies
which are likely to occur. Like other large power utilities the
Office of Power is characterised by its high use of computer
based models many of which can be used directly in decision-
making. Such models can be used to integrate much of the work
of different parts of the Office. Hence, human discretion in
dealing with uncertainty or new situations is far less evident
than in the previous case.
The Office's main interaction with its external environment
arises through provision of electricity. The TVA does not
itself supply end users but distributes to local distribution
companies. This environment consists of a limited number of
organised groups which the Office of Power directly affects,
and it is a routine interaction. These characteristics we
have noted as being suggestive of a simple environment.
Although the Office does need in its planning to consider
future demands for electricity, and there 'are many millions of
individual users who may all act differently, in reality
adequate models exist to forecast future demands.
The corporate environment of TVA takes in almost all of
the other divisions. For Some activities, e.g. station const-
ruction and control of water release for hydrogeneration the
interactions are so prima.ry that formal links do exist relating
to planning and operation 'withthe responsible divsions.
However, with many other divisions the relationship is
one in which these other divisions are undertaking development
or investigative work which in the present or future will
constrain the area in which the Office of Power can freely
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operate. In one way or another these activities all relate to
the quality of the physical environment. They are charged to
the power programme and their outputs can possibly increase
costs of power generation but the projects are generated and
controlled largely by the other divisions. The Division'of
Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife Development is one of these.
Following a similar argument to that applied to this case one
can expect that the Office of Power finds itself in an unbalanced
corporate environment in which linkages will not arise
spontaneously to the extent that it would wish.
Planning in Practice - At the time this Office was visited
it was suffering through problems due to the rise in price of coal, problems
with the introduction of nuclear capacity and much reduced future
demand forecasts - all of which directly or indirectly act to
increase the cost of a unit of electricity generated. It was,
therefore, to be expected that it would be especially sensitive
to added problems that it perceived as arising through having
to follow TVA procedures. Its links with other divisions
provide one example of this. Self-coordination was felt
not to be working and worries were expressed that insufficient
balancing occured between TVA power objectives and some of its
environmental ones. Other divisions were said at times to
generate projects which added unneccessarily to power costs,
and that these projects go ahead without sufficient opportunity
for the Office to comment. The Situation Assessment produced
at this time contained instances of this. In fact some moves
have been taken to strengthen 'self-coordinaion' as it relates
to this type of project. Other divisions are now required to
submit projects charged to the power programme. However, it
is still not clear what sanctions could be used against divisions
which do not comply. NOr do conflict resolution mechanisms
seem to have been built-in to the strengthened procedure.
In its internal planning the Office follows through an
essentially bottom-up procedure. No central planning unit
exists and although model systems are being developed which
would allow central planning to operate there were no current
plans to form such a unit. However, some problems are recognised
with the bottom-up procedure. A Situation Assessment is
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produced and ｾ ｡ ｮ ｹ Levels in the Office are asked to contribute.
But we were told that the results of extensive participation
are somewhat disappointing and produce relatively little. Some
disaffection with the procedure by employees was mentioned but
we were not able to confirm this. It was said that despite the
bottom-up procedures much of the substance of the plan of the
Office was generated at a senior level.
We find in the Office a curious contrast between form and
substance. The form of planning is bottom-up, the substance
seems to be largely top-down. And we find also some resistance
to adopting forms which make the top-down mode more explicit and
perhaps more efficient, for example, through setting up of a
central planning unit.
5.3. Conclusions of TVA
The empirical evidence from TVA, although largely unstructured
and qualitative, seems to support fully the propositions made
in Section 4.
The bottom-up system is meeting the needs of the complex
technology and environment of the Division of Forestry, Fisheries
and Wildlife Development, but not of the much simpler environment
and technology of the Office of Power. Moreover the unbalanced corporate
enviIDrurent the Office of Power finds itself in has left it unable
to achieve a satisfactory integration of its plans with those
of other divisions. Curiously, despite the perceived lack of
appropriateness of the planning system it uses, we found no
plans to re-organise the form of planning although developments
in the modelling field would support this. No tangible reasons
could be found for this reluctance - it was said to be not how
TVA operates. In fact the ideas we have developed in Section 3.3 are
essentially consistent with this; there is a need for some
degree of corporate wide consistency.
However, given such a need it is reasonable to speculate
on why the corporate system should be so different from one
which meets the needs of the Office which forms such a large
part of the total operation.
One reason may be that central planning systems are not
universally accepted as legitimate in the US setting. While
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a private power utility may not be bound by this, a federal
multi-purpose agency in a somewhat sensitive political position
may have to.
Another reason could be the view held by top management of
the corporation of what TVA is essentially about. There is
certainly a strong reaction against the proposition that TVA
has become just another power producer. The design of systems
clearly most suited to its non-power activities could be an
unconscious rejection of this proposition which is so much
supported by a nanrow look at, say, sources of the TVA funds.
Yet another reason could be that TVA policy makers perceive
the costs (in efficiency, adaptation, staff motivation) of
•under-centralising' and much less than the costs of 'over-
｣ ･ ｮ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｾ Since not all needs can be met by one system,
the system used may be thought of as the best compromise .. The
present state of knowledge in organisation science does not
allow us to test this hypothesis - a gap that will be discussed
in the overall conclusions to this paper.
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6. Conclusions
The work carried out has indicated the usefullness of using
the concepts of technology, environmental complexity and balance
in understanding the organization of planning systems. For
organizations having a fairly uniform technology and environment
these concepts could be of value in organization design. However
where technology and environment are not uniform across the
organization,'s activities we have found some support for the
proposition that the form used involves a complex trade-off.
Organization science cannot contribute to this trade-off until it
progresses beyond qualitative analysis to provide some measure of
the costs involved with different types of mal-adaptation - in
this case 'overcentralization' of planning as against 'under-
centralization'. Such measures do not appear to be in sight.
The discussion here has been limited to a fairly simple
organizational system, where the subsystems are divisions within
a corporate structure. For many important problems no such simple
organizational system exists. In cases of energy system management,
environmental management and regional development ( to list some
important examples) the organizational subsystems will generally
not belong to one corporate structure, and no single body may
have overall planning responsibility. We are then faced not only
with subsystem-system interfaces, but with interfaces between
different elements at the same system level. However despite the
added difficulties this presents for analysis the ideas presented
in this paper would appear to be equally relevant. The application
of them particularly to the regional development context forms
a part of current IIASA research concerned with organization for
integrated regional development. [8,9,10]
- 25 -
References
1. Report on the Study of the Tennessee Valley Authority
IIASA - to be published
lao Tomb, J. "Organization Structure of TVA"
lb. Davies, C. "Case Studies of Two TVA Divisions ll
lc. Tomlinson, R. "Planning in the TVA"
2. Beer, S. "Brain of the Firm ll Allan Lane 1972
3. Laurence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. "Organization and Environment"
Harvard 1967
4. Woodward, J. "Industrial Organization, Theory and Practice"
Oxford 1965
5. Perrow, C. "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of
Organization", American Social Review 1967
6. Jurkovich, R. "A Core Typology of Organizational Environments"
Administrative Science Quarterly 1974
7. Ashby, W.R. "Introduction to Cybernetics", Wiley 1956
8. Davies, C., Demb, A., Espejo, R. "An Overview of Organizational
Research in Regional Development" IIASA WP-76-14
9. Espejo, R. "A Method to Study the Organizational Dimension
of Regional Programs ll IIASA WP-76-14
10. Davies, C. "A Force Field Approach ·to Assessing Organization
for Regional Development" IIASA vlP-76-15
